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The Dictionary as a Specialized Corpus
Jennifer L. Mascott *
Scholars consider reliance on dictionary definitions to be the
antithesis of objective, big-data analysis of ordinary meaning. This
Article contests that notion, arguing that when dictionaries are treated
as a specialized database, or corpus, they provide invaluable textured
understanding of a term. Words appear in dictionaries both as terms
being defined and as terms defining other words. Examination of every
reference to a contested term throughout a dictionary’s definitional
entries of other words may substantially benefit statutory and
constitutional interpretation. Because dictionaries catalog language,
their use as a specialized corpus provides invaluable insight into the ways
a particular word is used in relation to terms throughout the English
language. Such evidence provides a crucial interpretive launchpad, even
for corpus-based researchers looking for a collection of possible word
meanings to analyze in a database of ordinary-language documents.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars have suggested that dictionary-based interpretive
research may be the antithesis of broad-based, objective corpus
linguistics analysis. 1 And done in its most traditional, and limited,
manner, it is.
Corpus linguistics research involves researching the way a
particular term is used in a big database 2 containing “a balance of
different genres of texts” to acquire a “representative slice” of the
term’s “usage and meaning.” 3 The idea is that by studying the context
of how a word is used in natural language the interpreter can acquire
a more unbiased picture of “ordinary meaning” 4 than by consulting
dictionaries—written for the express purpose of inviting “linguistic
scrutiny.” 5 Giving excessive weight to a single dictionary definition
may generate a conclusion about word meaning that is substantially
less-informed than interpretive analysis employing a broadbased corpus. 6
Despite these potential shortcomings of dictionary definitions
used as isolated interpretive tools, this Article will explore how
dictionaries used as a specialized corpus may supplement, and even
benefit, traditional corpus linguistics research. Looking in just one

1. See, e.g., Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies
and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1915–16, 1951–55
(characterizing dictionaries as “inadequate objects of our devotion” and contrasting reliance on
dictionary definitions with the use of more broad-based, empirical corpus linguistics techniques);
James C. Phillips et al., Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make
Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J.F. 21, 23–24 (2016) (contrasting the deficiencies of
exclusive reliance on founding era dictionaries with the benefits of corpus linguistics analysis).
2. See Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 9) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2918952)
(discussing Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics as
an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 156, 161–62 (2011)).
3. Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 24.
4. See Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1953–54 (suggesting that one way to assess a statutory
term’s “ordinary meaning” is to identify “the ‘common usage’ of a statutory term,” which may
be located “quantifiably through a linguistic methodology called corpus linguistics”).
5. Id. at 1954–55.
6. See Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 23–24.
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dictionary at the meanings specifically assigned to a given term may
very well provide a distortedly narrow understanding of the word. But
what if dictionaries contain previously unmined interpretive data?
Treating a dictionary as a mini corpus to examine how a particular
term is used in the context of defining the dictionary’s other terms can
provide richness to the study of word meaning. 7 Corpus linguistics
interpretive methodology often involves searching in a database
containing a wide variety of documents such as letters, newspapers,
pamphlets, and speeches—representing the language usage of a large
community. 8 But a corpus may also be specialized, focusing just “on a
particular linguistic community, such as a particular region, type of
language user, or genre of language.” 9 Dictionaries similarly could
serve as one type of mini specialized corpus—searched as their own
self-contained database containing definitions of words and utilizing
those words in context to define other terms. Examination of each and
every reference to a contested term throughout a dictionary’s
definitional entries of other words may substantially benefit
constitutional and statutory interpretation. It could bring greater
texture to one’s understanding of a contested term to see how it is
used to define other words throughout the breadth of the English
language. This may help an interpreter uncover numerous permissible
meanings of a term beyond those listed by the dictionary author in
the definitional entries for the term itself.
Such an approach may benefit constitutional interpretation in
particular. Linguistics scholars have shown that a legal interpreter’s
instinctive sense of the meaning of a term is not reliably consistent,
even when the term arises in a contemporary statute using
contemporary English. 10 Certainly, in comparison, a twenty-first

7. See, e.g., Mascott, supra note 2, Section II.B.2 (utilizing Nathan Bailey’s 1783
dictionary as a mini corpus as one resource to better understand the eighteenth-century meaning
of the word “officer”).
8. See Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 25, 31.
9. Id. at 25 (observing, for example, that “a corpus created [just] of the debates on the
federal Constitution would be a specialized corpus”).
10. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy A. Gales, Finding Ordinary Meaning in Law:
The Judge, the Dictionary or the Corpus? 2016 INT’L J. LEGAL DISCOURSE 253,
https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/ijld.2016.1.issue-2/ijld-2016-0016/ijld-20160016.pdf (describing research that shows “speakers of English are frequently unaware of the
contextual layers of meaning that accompany words—connotative meaning that is shared by
speakers of a language but is not recorded in dictionaries”).
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century interpreter of the Constitution could not reliably claim to
instinctively understand the terms in a 200-year-old document
without additional study. Such an interpreter would need to gain basic
familiarity with the historic English language. Canvassing how the
relevant term was used to help define other words throughout a
founding era English dictionary could be one tool to understand the
potential wide range of meaning of that term in the distant past. Or it
may help the interpreter to better discern how each of the dictionary’s
listed definitions for the word are more likely to be utilized in the
context of explaining other, perhaps related, words.
That said, if using a dictionary as a mini corpus simply helps to
give a little more context to an interpreter trying to choose from
among multiple definitional options (i.e., the various senses) of a given
term, is there any reason not to skip the dictionary and just head
straight to a more broad-based corpus? Why devote any more time to
a dictionary?
For starters, dictionaries serve as a kind of catalog of language. 11
They provide somewhat encyclopedic coverage of terms used
throughout the English language and often attempt to present
language in a way that is “representative of their times.” 12 Identifying
evidence of the manner in which a particular word is used in relation
to other terms throughout the entire range of the English language in
the targeted, relatively concise, form of the dictionary 13 may provide
an excellent starting point for interpretation.
In Part I, this Article first will catalog in greater depth the potential
downfalls that scholars have identified about overreliance on
dictionary definitions in constitutional and statutory interpretation.
Part I then will continue to explain how a more comprehensive review
of a dictionary as a mini corpus escapes some of those pitfalls and in
fact complements more traditional corpus linguistics analysis.
11. But see United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1043 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Judge
Frank Easterbook’s description of a dictionary as a “historical catalog,” a description used by
Judge Easterbrook and former Judge Richard Posner to contest the notion that dictionaries are
a useful tool for statutory interpretation) (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and
Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 67 (1994)).
12. Carey McIntosh, Eighteenth-Century English Dictionaries and the Enlightenment, 28
Y.B. ENG. STUD., 3, 3–4, 8–10 (1998) (noting also, however, some of the numerous problems
with eighteenth-century dictionaries).
13. See infra notes 70, 93 and accompanying text.
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For example, in working to flesh out the proper methodology for
the use of corpus linguistics in constitutional interpretive research,
Professor Lee Strang has suggested that a researcher should begin by
canvassing the case law and legal scholarship to identify several
possible meanings for the eighteenth-century constitutional term or
phrase under review. 14 He suggests the interpreter next should identify
which of those meanings (or “senses”) is being utilized each time the
term under review appears in the relevant corpus of documents that
the researcher is studying. 15 Professor Strang then suggests that
empirical assessment of the frequency with which the corpus employs
each potential meaning of the term may shed light on whether that
particular definition in fact represents what the word most
likely meant. 16
In an article analyzing the eighteenth-century meaning of the
term commerce, Professor Randy Barnett engaged in an approach
similar to the method that Professor Strang describes. 17 Professor
Barnett examined every use of the word commerce from 1728–1800
in a well-known founding era newspaper 18 to determine which of two
definitions of commerce debated in Supreme Court opinions was more
likely correct—a narrower meaning encompassing just “trading
activity” or a broader meaning including both “manufacturing and
agriculture.” 19 The absence of even a single unambiguous use of the
word commerce to describe manufacturing or agriculture provided
evidence that the eighteenth-century word commerce most likely
referred to just “trading activity.” 20
But what if a researcher has to answer a more open-ended question
about a word’s meaning rather than a binary inquiry such as whether

14. Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can Increase Originalism’s Methodological Rigor: Using
Corpus Linguistics to Reveal Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181,
1207–08 (2017).
15. See id. at 1209 (describing aspects of a possible method for analyzing the corpus via a
“stable of potential conventions” for the meaning of the term under review).
16. See id.
17. See generally Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce
Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847, 855, 858 (2003).
18. See id. at 856–57.
19. See id. at 848–49, 857–58 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
20. See id. at 850, 858–62.
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the eighteenth-century meaning of commerce encompassed
“manufacturing and agriculture”? 21 And what if modern cases stray so
far from a term’s possible eighteenth-century meaning that plugging
those distorted meanings into an eighteenth-century corpus search
would be useless or misleading? 22
In those cases, careful examination of how dictionaries from the
relevant time period used the term in the context of defining other
language might help the interpreter gain insight into a fuller, more
accurate range of plausible meanings to bear in mind during the
interpreter’s analysis of his corpus. The dictionary’s use of the relevant
word as it defines terms across the entire range of language might give
an interpreter a more informed understanding of the word “from the
ground up.” 23
After canvassing the potential pitfalls and benefits of dictionary
usage in Part I, Part II of this Article will walk through specific
examples demonstrating the interpretive benefits of using a dictionary
corpus in both constitutional and statutory interpretation. It will
describe the kind of information to be gleaned from using an
eighteenth-century dictionary as a mini corpus to define the term
officer, in comparison to the interpretive information available from a
broader corpus investigation of the word. Part II also will demonstrate
how consulting a dictionary as a mini corpus may benefit and
strengthen even more modern statutory interpretation.
In contemporary interpretation cases, judges have started to use
corpus linguistics-style techniques to better understand statutory
terms, such as former Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner’s use of

21. See, e.g., Mascott, supra note 2, at 47, 47 nn.270–73; cf. Mouritsen, supra note 2, at
204–05 (noting that corpus linguistics analysis can be applied in a more straightforward fashion
to a “neat, binary question of lexical ambiguity and ordinary meaning”).
22. See, e.g., Mascott, supra note 2, at 3–13 (describing how modern jurisprudence
interpreting the Article II term “officer” has diverged from the most likely eighteenth-century
meaning of the word); see also Strang, supra note 14, at 1208–09 (acknowledging the possibility
that “our practice is so unmoored from the Constitution’s original meaning that none of the
candidate conventions drawn from the practice will fit the evidence”; in such a case, at least
where originalist research has already been done on the constitutional provision of interest, the
researcher could consult the “secondary literature” to build the “stable” of plausible definitions
for the term).
23. Mascott, supra note 2, at 47.
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a form of collocation 24 to understand the statutory term harbor. 25 The
tendency has been for judges to look for the most frequently employed
sense of a word to discern the ordinary meaning of a statutory
provision. 26 But taking a quick snapshot of how the statutory term is
used throughout a dictionary in defining language may suggest in
some cases that the statutory term covers multiple compatible senses
of the word 27—not just the word’s most frequently used definition.
Rather than trying to limit statutory meaning to the most frequently
used meaning of a term, perhaps all permissible meanings (and
subcategories) consistent with the statutory context should be seen as
within a statute’s scope.
For example, in contrast to Judge Posner’s conclusion in the
harbor case, maybe to harbor includes both the behavior of intentional
concealment as well as the provision of a place to stay. 28 Similarly, the
constitutional phrase “Officers of the United States” includes both
principal and inferior Officers. 29 And the statutory phrase
“discharge . . . of [a] firearm” may encompass both a single shot and

24. See United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012) (examining the
frequency of the use of the verb “harboring” in connection with various objects such as
“enemies” or “refugees”); Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 25 (describing collocates as “word
neighbors” that “allow one to search for the words that most commonly appear within a certain
range of the key word or phrase”).
25. See infra notes 146–53 and accompanying text; see also Phillips et al., supra note 1, at
28–29 (describing Judge Posner’s analysis of forms of the word “harbor”).
26. See, e.g., Costello, 666 F.3d at 1044 (relying on a Google search that indicated the
word “harboring” had been used much more frequently in a way that described the concealment
of people needing to hide (e.g., “harboring enemies”) than as part of a phrase indicating just
provision of a “place to stay” (e.g., “harboring guests”)); see also Mouritsen, supra note 2, at
196–99 (examining the frequency of usage of the word “enterprise” to refer to a “noneconomically motivated enterprise” as opposed to an “economically motivated one” as a method
to help assess whether the “ordinary meaning” of “enterprise” carries with it an economic
connotation) (emphasis omitted).
27. See infra notes 171–75 and accompanying text.
28. Cf. infra notes 173–75 and accompanying text.
29. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (indicating as a textual matter that within the larger
class of “Officers of the United States” there is a subset of “inferior Officers”); see also, e.g.,
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 658–69 (1997) (discussing the categories of principal
and inferior officers subject to the Constitution’s Appointments Clause in Article II). The
Appointments Clause’s applicability to both principal and inferior officers would not become
any less legitimate if one were to run a corpus analysis and discover that the use of the phrase
“Officers of the United States” more frequently referred to principal officers than to inferior
officers. It always encompasses both kinds of officers, even though one of the two categories of
officers might be more frequently discussed than the other.
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a round of shots—which would mean it could be textually correct to
charge a defendant with only one statutory offense for firing a burst
of shots instead of charging separately for each and every bullet fired. 30
In this way, adopting an interpretive approach that views statutes as
encompassing all categories of meaning consonant with the relevant
statutory context may not necessarily lead to more criminalization or
regulation—but to less.
I. THE STRENGTHS OF DICTIONARIES AS CORPORA
Scholars and jurists have expressed concern about the dangers of
overreliance on dictionary definitions when trying to understand the
meaning of a term either in the Constitution or in a rank-and-file
question of statutory interpretation. 31 Stephen Mouritsen has done
extensive work unearthing essential insight into the relevant, but quite
limited, information available from dictionary definition entries in
statutory interpretation cases. 32 And in an article explaining the proper
limited role of founding era dictionaries in constitutional
interpretation, Professor Gregory Maggs identified six potential
problems with reliance on founding era dictionaries in particular. 33 He
describes them as the following: “(1) insufficiency, (2)
incompleteness, (3) inapplicability, (4) inconsistency, (5) imprecision,
and (6) incorrectness.” 34
Referencing a dictionary as a corpus, however, may help to
overcome some of these challenges. First, the problem of
“insufficiency” arises only where an interpreter relies solely on a term’s
dictionary definition to determine its meaning. 35 The second problem,
“incompleteness,” is a little broader. It refers to the fact that a

30. See infra note 175 and accompanying text; cf. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶¶ 1–
6, 356 P.3d 1258, 1261–62 (interpreting Utah Code section 76-10-508(1)(a) (“A person may
not discharge any kind of dangerous weapon or firearm . . . .”); id. at 1281–82 (Lee,
J., concurring).
31. See supra notes 1, 6 and accompanying text; see also Solan & Gales, supra note 10, at
3 (describing criticisms of dictionary use).
32. See generally Mouritsen, supra note 1; Mouritsen, supra note 2.
33. See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era
to Determine the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 358, 359–
61 (2014).
34. Id. at 361.
35. See id. at 368–69.
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dictionary definition may not list every possible meaning of a term
because of space constraints or the author’s views that a particular
usage is inaccurate. 36 On this point, examination of multiple
dictionaries 37—or investigation of a dictionary as a corpus—may be
helpful. A dictionary author may use the term under review in the
context of defining other words, thereby inadvertently providing
insight into a different or more nuanced definition omitted from the
dictionary entry for the term itself.
The other four concerns raised by Professor Maggs also may be
addressed by looking at sources other than just a single dictionary’s
definition. For instance, an ordinary dictionary’s definition may be
inapplicable because the Constitution was employing a term with a
specialized legal meaning not found in the particular dictionary the
interpreter referenced. 38 Or it may be imprecise because when
compiling dictionaries, lexicographers at times “[chose] broad
definitions that cover several possible meanings” rather than specifying
every single possible meaning of the term. 39 Professor Maggs suggests
these concerns can be ameliorated by consulting multiple
dictionaries 40 or founding era legal dictionaries 41 in addition to
ordinary language dictionaries.
In addition to the techniques suggested by Professor Maggs,
consulting a dictionary as a mini corpus may assist an interpreter,
particularly in cases of imprecision. Numerous additional distinct

36. See id. at 369–73.
37. See, e.g., id. at 371–72 (observing that the constitutional meaning of the term
“capitation” was missing from the definition of the term in Samuel Johnson’s dictionary but
present in John Ash’s dictionary).
38. See id. at 374.
39. Id. at 378.
40. Id. at 372–73. In contrast to Professor Maggs’s suggestion that consulting multiple
dictionaries may address the pitfalls of relying on just one dictionary, Stephen Mouritsen has
contended that multiple dictionaries are unlikely to provide additional insight because no
dictionary author wants to diverge too far from the definitions used by competitors. See
Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1943–44. Therefore, Mouritsen contends dictionary authors may
really represent only one point of view, rather than seeking to uncover the widest possible range
of meanings of the given term. See id. at 1941–45. But examining a dictionary as a corpus might
address Mouritsen’s concern. Additional senses of a term may be apparent from a dictionary
author’s inadvertent use of that term in the context of defining another word, which could reveal
the term has more possible meanings than just those the author was willing to directly state in
the definition for the term itself.
41. Maggs, supra note 33, at 375.
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shades of meaning (not included in the actual definition of the term)
might be apparent by the term’s use within the context of other
dictionary definitions. Using one, or even multiple, dictionaries as a
specialized corpus could help ensure no relevant usage of a term is
missed. For example, in a recent research project to identify the
meaning of officer in the late eighteenth century, I used the popular
Nathan Bailey’s dictionary 42 as a mini corpus. 43 The dictionary’s entry
for the term officer told the reader only that an “Officer” was “one
who is in an office.” 44 But in the course of searching for the word
officer in the dictionary’s definitions of all other words, I came across
more than 500 instances of use of the terms office(s) and officer(s). 45
These uses indicated that the terms officer and office encompassed an
enormously wide scope of governmental positions, ranging from “The
Lord President [of the King’s Council],” an apparently important
“officer of the Crown” who was “to propose business at the CouncilTable,” down to the “Swabber,” “an inferior officer on board a ship
of war” whose “office” was “to take care that the ship be kept clean.” 46
Professor Maggs provides the additional cautionary warning that
researchers should not apply inconsistent methodology in their use of
dictionaries—such as by consulting multiple dictionaries about one
contested term but only a single dictionary for another. 47 Further, he
notes that, at times, definitions in founding era dictionaries have been
found to be just plain incorrect through the author’s inadvertent
mistake or incorporation of obsolete meanings. 48 Other scholars have
echoed this concern that reliance on the use of words by too few
speakers, such as a single dictionary author, may give undue weight to
an author with an idiosyncratic view. 49 To account for these concerns,
42. N. BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Edward
Harwood ed., 25th ed. 1790).
43. See Mascott, supra note 2, Section II.B.2; id. at 38 n.209.
44. See id. at 40, 40 n.220 (internal quotations omitted).
45. See id. at 43.
46. See id. Section II.B.2; see also BAILEY, supra note 42 (defining “Swabber” as “an
inferior officer on board a ship of war, whose office is to take care that the ship be kept clean”);
id. (defining, under the letter “P,” “The Lord President [of the King’s Council]” as “an officer
of the Crown, who is to attend the Sovereign to propose business at the Council-Table, and to
report the several transactions there managed”).
47. See Maggs, supra note 33, at 377–78.
48. See id. at 380–81.
49. See Solan & Gales, supra note 10, at 3–5.
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interpreters of course should view examination of a dictionary corpus
as just one tool in the toolbox. But it is a very useful tool.
Former Judge Richard Posner, who has extensively theorized
about statutory interpretation, has raised the additional complication
that “[d]ictionary definitions are acontextual.” 50 This is a key concern
because to really understand a term, interpreters must pay “careful
attention to the nuances and specialized connotations that speakers of
the relevant language attach to particular words and phrases in the
context in which they are being used.” 51
A dictionary’s use as a mini corpus alleviates this particular
difficulty, however, inasmuch as uses of the contested term within
definitions for other words are in fact contextual. For example, an
interpreter seeking to understand whether the term enterprise carries
a connotation of “economic motivation” 52 may gain insight from
examining a dictionary’s contextual use of the word enterprise to
define other terms. Contextual uses of the term enterprise throughout
Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 53 show the word carries
50. United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012).
51. Id. (quoting John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise
Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1704 (2004)).
52. See Mouritsen, supra note 2, at 180 (using corpus linguistics techniques to evaluate
whether the term “enterprise” in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) includes within its scope only organizations with an “economic motivation”). Mr.
Mouritsen’s statistical analysis led him to conclude that the word “enterprise” is used
overwhelmingly to refer to economically motivated organizations. See id. at 196–202. But the
more than seventy uses of variants of the word “enterprise” to define other words in Webster’s
Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (7th ed. 1963) had both economic and noneconomic
connotations, see infra notes 53–57, falling more in line with the linguistics studies critiqued by
Mr. Mouritsen, which had declined to define “enterprise” in primarily economic terms, see
Mouritsen, supra note 2, at 185–86. Nonetheless, Mr. Mouritsen’s ultimate conclusion that the
RICO statute criminalizes economic activity likely is correct—but more because the context
surrounding the statutory term “enterprise” seems to suggest it refers to economic activity, not
because the word “enterprise” inherently has that limited meaning. See id. at 184–85; see also 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct . . . such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt.” (emphasis added)).
53. WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1963), https://ia800503
.us.archive.org/32/items/webstersseventhn00unse/webstersseventhn00unse.pdf [hereinafter
WEBSTER’S]. This collegiate dictionary represents that it is based on Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary, id., a dictionary much maligned by Justice Antonin Scalia, see Antonin
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, A Note on the Use of Dictionaries, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 419, 427 (2013)
(describing Webster’s Third International Dictionary as “a dictionary to be used cautiously
because of its frequent inclusion of doubtful, slip-shod meanings without adequate usage
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with it both economic and noneconomic meanings. The dictionary
defines (i) an adventurer to be “one that engages in risky commercial
enterprises for profit” 54 and (ii) a cartel as “a combination of
independent commercial enterprises designed to limit competition” 55—both uses that connote a commercial endeavor. But it also
defines management as “the collective body of those who manage or
direct an enterprise” 56 and a jumping-off place as “a place from which
an enterprise is launched” 57—uses that suggest an enterprise can be any
type of collective venture.
Corpus linguistics scholars generally have preferred “naturally
occurring” samples of language 58 over dictionaries. The thinking is
that dictionary definitions exist primarily to inform language study
and thus are somewhat contrived. 59 In contrast, writers and speakers
generating documents typically found in a corpus, like newspapers and
letters, did not necessarily write or speak intending their words to
be used as evidence of a particular term’s meaning. 60 Therefore,
these word uses are more genuine, better reflecting a term’s
ordinary meaning.

notes”). Nonetheless, this Article utilizes the collegiate dictionary because it is freely available
on the Internet, thus making it possible for readers to easily access the cited dictionary and
replicate this paper’s analysis. For purposes of simply illustrating the possible interpretive
information to be gleaned from use of a dictionary as a corpus, this collegiate dictionary is
adequate. A spreadsheet cataloging the dictionary’s uses of variants of the term enterprise is
available at https://drive.google.com/drive/u/3/folders/1c-55oJnBDue8I3XFelYiPVjUkb
DjI7Kv.
54. WEBSTER’S, supra note 53, at 13 (including this meaning as one of the definitions of
the term adventurer) (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 128 (including this meaning as one of the definitions of the term cartel)
(emphasis added).
56. Id. at 513 (including this meaning as one of the definitions of the term management).
57. Id. at 460 (including this meaning as one of the definitions of the phrase jumpingoff place).
58. See Mouritsen, supra note 2, at 190.
59. See id. at 170 (observing that dictionary authors intend to set forth all permissible
meanings of a given word without regard to the frequency of use of a particular meaning and
without attempting to address “what meaning a word must bear in a particular context”
(quoting HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW 1190 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P
Frickey eds., 1994))).
60. See Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1954–55 (“[D]ata in a corpus are considered ‘natural’
because they were not elicited for the purpose of study. That is, generally no one asks the speakers
or writers whose words are represented in the corpus to speak or write for the purpose of
subjecting their words to linguistic scrutiny.”).
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But use of dictionaries as a corpus ameliorates this disparity. A
dictionary author’s use of a particular word within its definitions for
other terms is not intended to influence the public’s perception of the
contested word. Rather, the author inadvertently referenced the
contested term in the course of trying to define another word. As
such, the contested term’s use in a dictionary corpus is at least
somewhat less skewed evidence than the dictionary entry for the
term itself.
The real benefit of turning to dictionaries as a specialized corpus,
however, may be their potential for increasing an interpreter’s
understanding of the range of permissible meanings of a contested
term. Scholars agree that one legitimate use of dictionaries is to
demonstrate that a certain meaning of a word is permissible. 61
Professor Lee Strang builds on this idea by suggesting that
constitutional analysis in particular may benefit from interpreters first
identifying the range of potential meanings associated with the term
in question. 62 Specifically, Professor Strang explains that scholars may
build this “stable of possible language conventions” by looking at
Supreme Court case law defining the relevant term, studying prior
scholarship on the term, or “conducting a pilot study of the corpus”
to see what relevant meanings are contained within primary and
secondary sources. 63 Equipped with a well-developed list of meanings
that “plausibly fit the studied text,” the scholar can then test those
meanings to see which has the “best fit” with the relevant corpus. 64
Here again, examination of a dictionary as a corpus could be
immensely useful. A dictionary attempts to define terms throughout
the entire range of language. Examining how the term of interest is
used in relationship to multiple other words (in the context of defining
those words) could assist in the compilation of a complete stable of

61. See id. at 1921–23 (contrasting this with the use of a dictionary to prove that one of
the permissible meanings is the most typical, or the most likely, ordinary meaning of the word);
Maggs, supra note 33, at 359–61, 364–67 (suggesting that founding era dictionaries may
provide evidence relevant to interpreters seeking to discern several different types of original
meaning of the Constitution—despite dictionaries’ potential pitfalls).
62. See Strang, supra note 14, at 1207–09.
63. Id. at 1207–08.
64. Id. at 1207–09, 1228.

1569

8.MASCOTT_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/26/2018 4:09 PM

2017

potential meanings of a term. 65 Such an examination may identify
meanings that are not immediately apparent from existing case law or
scholarship. Or it may identify meanings that were excluded from the
dictionary’s definition of the term under review, as that term’s
definitional entry may not capture every nuance available from seeing
the term used in context. 66 Just like “computer-assisted” research
techniques in general, 67 a comprehensive search of a dictionary corpus
helps identify a potentially wide range of meanings of a term.
Examination of dictionary corpora also preserves an additional
corpus linguistics-related benefit cited by judges and scholars. Justice
Thomas R. Lee has praised corpus linguistics analysis as being “subject
to replication” because it utilizes a “transparent database that is
publicly available.” 68 This is superior to earlier, conventional styles of
statutory and constitutional analysis in which an interpreter might
“cherry pick” and selectively cite evidence supportive of his
interpretation. 69 Similarly, a corpus linguistics-style analysis of every
use of a term in one dictionary, or set of dictionaries, also is replicable
and transparent. Any follow-on researcher can access the cited
dictionary and examine its contextual uses of the contested term to
verify whether they support the interpreter’s position.
Even if dictionaries fail to reflect the true, contemporary usage of
a word, 70 they nonetheless are a huge part of our culture’s “common
linguistic experience”—which is what makes objective statutory and
constitutional interpretation possible in the first place. 71 Dictionaries
65. Cf. id. at 1207–08 (observing that “a pilot study of the corpus” or review of the
“secondary literature on the subject” might be helpful if case law and current legal practice do
not seem to provide “plausible conventions” for the eighteenth-century meaning of the relevant
constitutional term or phrase).
66. See Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 23 (“Context matters, and dictionaries (especially
from the Founding Era) do not capture context . . . .”).
67. See Strang, supra note 14, at 1204–07 (describing the use of “[c]omputer-assisted
research techniques” in originalism).
68. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 93, 356 P.3d 1258, 1282 (Utah 2015) (Lee,
J., concurring).
69. See Barnett, supra note 17, at 856, 856 n.30 (describing the difficulty in the past of
“know[ing] whether the evidence of usage offered by a particular historian was typical or cherrypicked” prior to the advent of the wide availability of electronic founding era sources).
70. See Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1922–24, 1931–32 (noting the shortcomings of a
dictionary in determining a word’s ordinary usage).
71. See Strang, supra note 14, at 1220–22 (concluding that eighteenth-century Americans
had a sufficiently “common linguistic experience” through the circulation of newspapers and
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are routinely consulted as evidence of a word’s linguistic meaning. 72
Whether or not a particular dictionary accurately reflected the
meaning of a term at the time it was written, that dictionary certainly
will have a prospective influence on words’ meanings. Just as courts
reference dictionaries to assist in statutory interpretation, ordinary
citizens access dictionaries to acquire greater insight into the meaning
of particular words. As dictionaries are likely to shape the meaning of
words moving forward in time from their publication and circulation,
they must be consulted by anyone seeking to uncover how an
educated English speaker would understand the studied term. 73
Comprehensive examination of a dictionary as a corpus is a great
means for acquiring a more textured and in-depth understanding of
a word.
One final concern raised about founding era dictionaries, in
particular, is that their authors often engaged in what today would be
considered plagiarism 74—cribbing at least in part from earlier
dictionaries. Therefore, founding era dictionary definitions may not
necessarily reflect an author’s attempt to accurately and independently
characterize the correct contemporary meaning of a term as of the
time the author was compiling the dictionary. 75 Founding era

their wide familiarity with certain texts like the Bible that it is possible to discern a nationwide
objective meaning of the Constitution); cf. McIntosh, supra note 12, at 4 (noting that founding
era dictionaries were “intended for a wide current readership” and the “compilers of dictionaries
and the booksellers who offered dictionaries to the public would not have printed one that
seemed completely out of touch with current usage”).
72. See Maggs, supra note 33, at 359–60; Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 30 (noting that
both lawyers and judges use dictionaries and the potential fallacies of dictionary usage do “not
mean we should not use dictionaries” but simply that “we should strive to use them better”);
Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1915–16 (describing judges’ reliance on dictionaries).
73. Cf. Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 21–22 (“Original public meaning originalism . . .
seeks to determine ‘the meaning the words and phrases of the Constitution would have had, in
context, to ordinary readers, speakers, and writers of the English language, reading a document
of this type, at the time adopted.’” (quoting Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113,
1118 (2003))).
74. See Maggs, supra note 33, at 383–84 (reporting that Samuel Johnson and one of the
compilers of Nathan Bailey’s dictionaries may have relied on each other’s efforts when compiling
their respective dictionaries); McIntosh, supra note 12, at 3–4 (“[E]very eighteenth-century
dictionary drew heavily on its predecessors, sometimes lifting definitions word-for-word from
books published fifty years earlier or more.”).
75. See Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1943–44 (questioning the independence of dictionary
authors because “the history of English lexicography usually consists of a recital of successive
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dictionaries like Samuel Johnson’s dictionary also included sample
uses of words from very old, non-contemporaneous texts like the Bible
or works by Shakespeare. 76 But such a critique evaluates dictionaries
simply as reflections of some kind of contemporary, objectively correct
word meaning—suggesting they are inaccurate reflections at best. It
neglects to account for the idea that widely available dictionaries may
have been powerful influencers of word meaning moving forward. 77
Not only would William Shakespeare and the Bible have remained
influential sources of understanding in the founding era, 78 the very fact
that an eighteenth-century dictionary incorporated particular word
meanings may have had great influence on a learned writer’s sense of
the meaning of language in 1787 and 1788.
II. EXAMPLES OF DICTIONARIES AS A MINI CORPUS, IN PRACTICE
Part II of this Article will provide concrete examples of some of
the interpretive benefits of consulting dictionaries as corpora. First, in
constitutional interpretation, examination of the specialized corpus of
Nathan Bailey’s founding era dictionary 79 provides detailed insight
into the vast scope of government officials viewed as officers in the
eighteenth century. Second, examination of a contemporary
dictionary’s contextual references to the term harbor—a contested
statutory term in a recent federal appeals court case—shows how the
use of dictionaries as a corpus may provide an in-depth, textured
starting point to discerning ordinary meaning. 80

and often successful acts of piracy” (internal quotation omitted)); Phillips et al., supra note 1, at
23 (observing that founding era dictionaries “are more likely to reflect what words meant in the
early 1600s than the late 1700s” because many of them were “based on Samuel Johnson’s
Dictionary,” which in turn “heavily relied on earlier sources”).
76. See, e.g., SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed.
1768) (citing the Bible as the source for one of its definitions of “artillery” and Shakespeare as
its source for the meaning of “all-cheering”), https://books.google.com/books/about/A
_Dictionary_of_the_English_Language.html?id=03Q7AAAAcAAJ.
77. Cf. McIntosh, supra note 12, at 4 (referring to dictionaries as “intended for a wide
current readership”).
78. See Strang, supra note 14, at 1221 (noting that the Bible “was a staple throughout
the nation” in the founding era).
79. BAILEY, supra note 42.
80. See infra Section II.B.

1572

8.MASCOTT_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1557

4/26/2018 4:09 PM

The Dictionary as a Specialized Corpus

A. Constitutional Interpretation: Article II Term Officer
In recent work, I analyzed the meaning of the term officers in
Article II of the Constitution. 81 Examination of every use of the terms
office(s) and officer(s) in a founding era dictionary imparted a range of
understanding of the term that expanded on the information about
officers available from a more traditional corpus linguisticsstyle analysis. 82
Article II permits only four specific appointment methods for
“Officers of the United States.” 83 As an initial matter, corpus
linguistics-style analysis was critical in determining that the phrase
“Officers of the United States” was not a new term of art setting aside
an especially important group of government positions. Rather,
evidence suggested the phrase referenced a class of federal-level, as
opposed to state-level, officers. 84
This conclusion was supported by the Article II drafting history as
well as a key-word-in-context (KWIC)-style analysis of every use of
the phrase “Officer(s) of the United States” in a specialized corpus. 85
Specifically, that research indicated the phrase “Officers of the United
States” first came into use during the Continental Congress era and
was used to describe officers in the Continental Army. 86 Multiple
speakers described the group of “Officers of the United States” using
different phrasing like “officers of the government” or “officers of the
union,” suggesting the precise Article II phrasing did not constitute a

81. See generally Mascott, supra note 2.
82. See id. Section II.B.2.
83. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”).
84. See Mascott, supra note 2, Section II.A.2.
85. See id.; see also Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 24–25 (discussing the use of specialized
corpora, including Professor Randy Barnett’s use of the Pennsylvania Gazette as a specialized
corpus). This specialized corpus consisted primarily of legally significant documents traditionally
viewed as relevant to originalist analysis such as the Constitution, Articles of Confederation, one
Readex database of eighteenth-century newspapers, the Journals of the Continental Congress,
the Federalist and anti-Federalist essays, and the drafting and ratification debates. See Mascott,
supra note 2, Part II.
86. See Mascott, supra note 2, Section II.A.2.e.
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term of art. 87 Moreover, there were relatively few references to the full
phrase “Officers of the United States” in a specialized corpus of
documents related to the Constitution’s formation, suggesting the
framers did not believe they were creating a specialized new level of
federal official in the Appointments Clause. 88 For example, out of
approximately 600 uses of office[s] and officer[s] in The Federalist
Papers and anti-Federalist essays, the phrase “Officer(s) of the United
States” appeared only thirteen times. 89
Elimination of the likelihood that “Officers of the United States”
was a new term of art creating a special subcategory of officials was a
significant contribution of the corpus analysis. It suggested that
research into the meaning of the individual term officer was relevant
for determining the scope of government officials subject to
the Appointments Clause requirements for “Officers of the
United States.”
But the question remained—how would speakers of eighteenthcentury English have defined the term officer? What is the full range
of federal officials that came within the scope of the phrase “Officers
of the United States” at the time of the Constitution’s formation?
Identifying the entire scope of federal officials encompassed by the
Article II Appointments Clause in some ways is a different type of
interpretive question than the kind that judges and courts previously
have evaluated utilizing corpus linguistics methods. 90 For example, the
Supreme Court in 2010 evaluated whether the word personal
ordinarily includes a reference to corporations. 91 In addition, Justice
Thomas R. Lee of the Utah Supreme Court conducted an empirical
corpus linguistics analysis of whether the term discharge more

87. See id. Part II.A.2.c (internal quotations omitted).
88. See id.
89. See id.; Mascott, Who are “Officers of the United States”?: Appendix, 70 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 4–5) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2918956 [hereinafter Appendix] (depicting this data based on a search using
the AntConc corpus linguistics research platform). See Anthony, L. (2014), AntConc (Version
3.4.4w (Windows)) [Computer Software], Tokyo, Japan: Waseda University, http://www.
laurenceanthony.net/.
90. See Mascott, supra note 2, at 47.
91. See Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1955 n.224 (discussing the debate over “personal
privacy” in FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397 (2011)).
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ordinarily means one single shot or multiple shots. 92 These binary
questions lend themselves to the empirical analysis of which one of
two possible answers to the legal question is more probable based on
the most common usage of a term. 93 But what if an interpreter is trying
to uncover the definition of a term “from the ground up”? 94
Applying Professor Strang’s methodology of identifying a “stable
of possible language conventions” 95 to a search for the eighteenthcentury meaning of officer would lead to the identification of several
initial possible meanings for the term. Current Supreme Court
doctrine suggests officers have “significant authority”; 96 Executive
Branch research suggests that officers hold a “continuing” position
that has been delegated “a portion of the sovereign powers of the
federal Government”; 97 and legal scholarship suggests, in one instance,
that officers are those with continuing sovereign authority delegated
by statute. 98 But none of these standards provides much direction due
to lack of specificity, and evidence suggests that none of the standards
is entirely accurate, at least as an original matter. 99
So how would an interpreter make sure to uncover all possible
language conventions defining officer and determine the full range of
officials coming within that definition? Professor Lee Strang suggests
an initial search of primary and secondary sources may be beneficial. 100
Another possible starting point could be to consult a dictionary.
In this case, as one might expect, examination of founding era
dictionary entries for “office(r)” was not immediately instructive.
Multiple founding era dictionaries defined “officer” simply as a “man

92. See State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶¶ 54–88, 356 P.3d 1258, 1275–82 (Lee,
J., concurring).
93. See Mascott, supra note 2, at 47, 47 n.271; Mouritsen, supra note 2, at 196, 204–05
(describing how binary questions about a word’s meaning are readily compatible with a
straightforward empirical corpus linguistics analysis).
94. See Mascott, supra note 2, at 47.
95. See Strang, supra note 14, at 1207–08.
96. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125–26 (1976).
97. See Steven G. Bradbury, Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the
Appointments Clause, 31 OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNS. 73, 73, 77 (2007).
98. Stacy M. Lindstedt, Developing the Duffy Defect: Identifying Which Government
Workers Are Constitutionally Required to be Appointed, 76 MO. L. REV. 1143, 1177–78 (2011).
99. See Mascott, supra note 2, at 3–13.
100. See Strang, supra note 14, at 1207.
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employed by the publick”; 101 Nathan Bailey’s 1783 dictionary defined
“officer” even more simply as “one who is in an office.” 102
But use of a founding era dictionary as a corpus was highly
informative. In particular, I examined each of the more than 500
references to office and officer in the twenty-fifth edition of Nathan
Bailey’s dictionary from 1783 103—thought to be “the bestselling
dictionary of the eighteenth century.” 104 Bailey’s dictionary has
received praise for working “to include common words and to define
words as they were actually used.” 105 In particular, the dictionary’s
introduction admonished that it ought “to be the special Care and
Study of every one” to “get a true and distinct Idea of the proper
Sense and Meaning of Words, and Terms of Art, in which they are
expressed, without which no good Progress can be made.” 106 The
dictionary editor then marketed the dictionary as helping people
better understand the entirety of language 107 by eliminating the
redundancies in other dictionaries and adding “several thousand
English words and phrases” that had not appeared previously in any
English dictionary. 108
Regardless of whether Bailey’s twenty-fifth edition suffered from
some of the typical founding era dictionary ailments like incorrectness,
it certainly was intended to shape the public meaning of the terms that
it defined. Thus, the dictionary is relevant in assessing the culturally

101. Mascott, supra note 2, at 39. Alternate senses of the word were “a commander in the
army” or “one who has the power of apprehending criminals.” See id. at 39, 39 n.211. But it is
apparent from the surrounding context of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, that the Appointments
Clause is broader than just referencing military commanders or law enforcement. See U.S. Const.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Consequently, the sense of the word relevant to this clause is “man employed
by the publick.” See Mascott, supra note 2, at 39, 39 n.211.
102. See Mascott, supra note 2, at 40 n.220.
103. See id. at 38, 43.
104. Maggs, supra note 33, at 383.
105. See id.
106. BAILEY, supra note 42, at vii.
107. Id. at vi (“It has therefore been the universal Practice of all polite Nations, to make
the Study of Letters the first Business of Life: And because this Accomplishment is necessary to
all Persons, and but few, comparatively speaking, have the Advantage of a learned Education to
any considerable Proficiency, Dictionaries have in all Languages been compiled, to which, as to
Storehouses, such Persons may have Recourse, as often as any Thing occurs in Conversation or
Reading, with which they are unacquainted, or when they themselves would speak or write
properly and intelligibly.”).
108. Id. at xii.
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shared understanding of words at the time the Constitution was
drafted and ratified—several years after the dictionary’s publication
in 1783.
In contrast to Bailey’s definitions of the terms officer and office
themselves, 109 his use of these words in context to define other terms
greatly informs the understanding of the broad scope of founding era
officials considered to be officers. The dictionary described numerous
officials as “officers” or as holding “offices” even when their jobs
consisted of recordkeeping, assisting higher-level officials, and
performing menial tasks 110 that seem to fall below the current Supreme
Court’s standard of “significant authority.” 111
Following is a partial list of such officials: 112
Record-Keepers: (i) “Corrector [of the Staple]”: recorded
bargains by merchants in a public store-house; (ii) “Purser” on the
king’s ship: provided food and bedding supplies to people on board
the ship and kept track of crew member pay; (iii) “Clerk of the Acts”:
registered orders by the Commissioners of the Navy and received
warrants and commissions; (iv) “Clerk of the Ordinance”: recorded
the names of officers and government orders; (v) “Clerk of the Peace”:
read indictments and enrolled government acts; (vi) “Clerk of the
Pells”: recorded bills on a parchment roll.
Assistants: (i) “[M]essengers [of the Exchequer]”: “attend[ed] the
Lord Treasurer, and carr[ied] his letters and orders”; (ii) “Satellites,
Life-Guards, or Officers: attend[ed] upon a Prince”; (iii) “Swordbearers”: “carrie[d] the sword of state before a magistrate.”
Officials with Menial Duties: (i) “Agistator”: “took cattle into the
forest”; (ii) “Ale-Conner/Ale-Taster”: tested the “goodness of bread
[and] ale”; (iii) “Assay Master”: weighed bullion to make sure it was
“according to the national standard”; (iv) “Beadle”: made
“garnishments for the courts of the forest”; (v) “Botiler/Butler”:
provided the king with wine; (vi) “Chafe-Wax”: “fit[ted] the wax for
109. Id. (“Duty”: “any Thing that one is obliged to do; a publick Tax.”; “Officer”: “one
who is in an Office”; “Office”: “the Part or Duty of that which befits, or is to be expected from
one; a Place or Employment; also a good or ill Turn.”).
110. See Mascott, supra note 2, at 43–46.
111. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991) (concluding that it was
relevant to Article II “officer” status whether an official exercises “significant discretion” or
“perform[s] more than ministerial tasks”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125–26 (1976).
112. The terms in the next three paragraphs and their descriptions, often verbatim, are
taken from Mascott, supra note 2, at 43–46.
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the sealing of writs”; (vii) “Expenditor”: “a steward or officer, who
look[ed] after the repairs of the banks of [a] [m]arsh”; (viii)
“Gauger[s]”: measured liquids on merchant ships; (ix) “Searcher[s]”:
examined and marked defects on cloth; (x) “Sewer”: placed the meat
on the table of the King or a Nobleman; (xi) “Swabber[s]”:
cleaned warships.
The detailed nature of the picture of officers that emerges from
this review of Nathan Bailey’s dictionary adds even to the depth of
information available from studying a specialized corpus of key
founding era documents that debated the meaning of the
Constitution. 113 Numerous statements from this specialized corpus
suggest the eighteenth-century public would have understood officers
to include many government officials including those with less
significant duties. 114 For instance, a speaker in the North Carolina
ratifying convention described “petty officers with ‘trifling’ duties.” 115
And statements during the convention to draft the Constitution
referenced “ministerial officers” and suggested the Appointments
Clause applied to officials with duties as minor as those of “tidewaiter[s]” who monitor the unloading of imported goods. 116 But no
statement in the specialized corpus purported to identify a
comprehensive group of officials falling under the term officers.
Similarly, evidence from the mini corpus of Bailey’s dictionary
builds upon the understanding of officer available from a more typical,
broad-based corpus linguistics study incorporating a variety of more
everyday texts. Scholars are building a new Corpus of founding era
American English (COFEA), which will give constitutional
interpreters access to “at least 100 million words” 117 from a
representative set of founding era texts. 118 COFEA-affiliated scholars
generously provided me with access to more than 16,000 documents
from the papers of various founding fathers that the COFEA
developers acquired from http://founders.archives.gov and

113. See supra note 85.
114. See supra note 85.
115. Mascott, supra note 2, at 49, 49 n.280.
116. Id. at 50 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
117. Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 31.
118. Id. at 22, 31; see also Mascott, supra note 2, at 56.
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converted to text files for use in corpus linguistics software. 119 This
particular group of documents ranged primarily from 1783 to 1789
and included letters, diaries, and speech texts, 120 providing the
representative types of naturally occurring communicative sources
desirable in corpus analysis. 121
A sampling 122 of references to office(s) and officer(s) in these
documents provided useful but limited information helping to flesh
out the eighteenth-century meaning of “officer.” Within these
“naturally occurring” documents the phrase “Officer(s) of the United
States” occurred only ten times—exclusively in duplicate materials
already included in my specialized founding era corpus. 123 In contrast,
119. See Mascott, supra note 2, at 56. These documents are available on Google Drive at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0BwymGPo3iNE4TUJScjNFQnU4a0k in a sub-folder
labeled “Confederacy files/text/”.
120. See Mascott, supra note 2, at 56; see also the spreadsheet labeled
“Confederacyindex17831789.xls” located within the folder labeled “Confederacy files” at the
Google site listed in supra note 119. The COFEA developers created this spreadsheet, which
lists the date, title, and source of each of the 16,000 documents.
121. See Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1955 (describing the compilation of a typical corpus
as including “newspapers, books, transcripts of conversations, or interviews”).
122. See Strang, supra note 14, at 1206 (suggesting that a researcher “may randomly
sample” results if “search returns are too large to manage effectively”); cf. Mouritsen, supra note
1, at 1958 (examining a random sample of 500 of one corpus’s 82,687 references to the word
“carry”); Solan & Gales, supra note 10, at 13 (sampling the “even numbered occurrences” of
the uses of a particular term).
123. See Mascott, supra note 2, at 57; see also Appendix, supra note 89, at 9 (including
screen shots depicting these search results). The documents also included four additional
references to the proper noun phrase, “Loan Officer of the United States” (or “of the U.S.”).
See Report of a Committee to Establish a Land Office, 30 April 1784, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-07-02-0148 (last modified Nov. 26,
2017) (file labeled “228716-body.txt”); Report Concerning Continental Bills of Credit, [7 May
1784], FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-07-020157 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “228758-body.txt”); To George Washington
from John Hopkins, 10 April 1789, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Washington/05-02-02-0044 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “243663body.txt”); To James Madison from John Hopkins, 10 April 1789, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-12-02-0048 (last modified Nov. 26,
2017) (file labeled “243665-body.txt”). The other ten uses of “Officer(s) of the United States”
arose during the Constitutional Convention or the ratification debates or within essays from The
Federalist Papers—duplicates of sources my specialized corpus already contained. See supra note
85 and accompanying text; see also Constitutional Convention. Plan of Government, [18 June
1787], FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-04-020099 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “237557-body.txt”); The Federalist Number
44, [25 January] 1788, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents
/Madison/01-10-02-0251 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “239831-body.txt”); The
Federalist No. 67, [11 March 1788], FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/
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within just this seven-year period of documents, the terms office and
officer occurred 5,897 times 124—arguably an unwieldy quantity of
concordance lines to meaningfully examine. So, to get a quick sense
of the range of usages of office(s) and officer(s) in this corpus I
examined the first 200 concordance lines containing those terms. 125
In the vast majority of cases across this sample, the term officer
referred to military positions. Scores of those military officer references
included no immediate context describing their particular rank or
authority level. 126 Some references were a little more revealing,
showing that a fairly wide range of military positions were considered
to be “officer” positions. For instance, the words officer and office
described people with positions ranging from brigadier general, 127 to

documents/Hamilton/01-04-02-0217 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (two uses) (file labeled
“240320-body.txt”); The Federalist No. 69, [14 March 1788], FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://
founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-04-02-0220 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017)
(two uses) (file labeled “240342-body.txt”); The Federalist No. 76, [1 April 1788], FOUNDERS
ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/ Hamilton/01-04-02-0228 (last modified
Nov. 26, 2017) (two uses) (file labeled “240473-body.txt”); The Federalist No. 77, [2 April
1788], FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-04-020229 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “240477-body.txt”); New York Ratifying
Convention. Fourth Speech of June 28 (John McKesson’s Version), [28 June 1788], FOUNDERS
ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-05-02-0012-0044 (file
labeled “241222-body.txt”).
124. See Mascott, supra note 2, at 56; see also Appendix, supra note 89, at 8 (depicting
these results).
125. Selecting the first 200 concordance hits in this particular database was
nonrepresentative in the sense that this database generally was ordered by date, meaning that
most of the uses I studied occurred within only a very short time span of the corpus data. See
supra note 120 (date column described in in the Confederacy spreadsheet). Nonetheless, the
sampling shows at least a taste of the interpretive information available from a search of naturally
occurring corpus documents, in contrast to the wider swath of information that may be available
through a dictionary mini corpus. (This particular research on 200 concordance lines from the
COFEA files does not appear in my detailed Stanford study on eighteenth-century officers. The
corpus linguistics-style analysis in that article focused mainly on the specialized founding era
materials previously referenced by this Article.) See generally Mascott, supra note 2, Part II.
126. See, e.g., To George Washington from Antoine-Jean-Louis Le Bègue de Presle Duportail,
30 September 1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Washington/99-01-02-11871 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) [hereinafter To Washington from
Duportail] (file labeled “227395-body.txt”) (referring numerous times to “Artillery Officer(s)”
without any immediate contextual information indicating the rank or authority level of
the officers).
127. Virginia Delegates to Benjamin Harrison, 8 September 1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-07-02-0169 (last modified Nov. 26,
2017) (file labeled “227252-body.txt”) (referring to “Brigr. Genl. McClene, the british officer
commdg. at Detroit”).
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captains and lieutenants 128 and lieutenant colonels and majors, 129 to
ensigns, “Surgeons Mates,” 130 engineers, 131 and a deputy quarter
master. 132 In contrast, sergeants, corporals, and privates were indicated
as nonofficers. 133 Documents described military personnel as
belonging to one of two categories, labeled “officers [and] men” 134 or
“[o]fficers and [s]oldiers.” 135
There were a few references to “officer” that were meaningful in
that they helped to identify a number of distinct, fairly high-level
officials who were characterized as officers or as holding offices. But
none of the references provided contextual information indicating the
particular characteristics that led these officials’ positions to be
thought of as offices. For example, one document referred to “many
Officers” at “the head of the Departement of the Artillery.” 136 Another
128. To Washington from Duportail, supra note 126 (“Thus one of the Captains or
Lieutenants may be detached that makes 16 Officers for the two Regiments . . . .”).
129. Id. (“[O]ne of the field Officers, the Lt Col. or the Major may be
detached also . . . .”).
130. From George Washington to United States Congress, 8 September 1783, FOUNDERS
ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-11803
(last
modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “227250-body.txt”) (“Perhaps it is rather unimportant . . .
whether the third Officer of a Compy shall be called a Lt or an Ensign, . . . but I highly approve
the scheme of having supernumeraries appointed to fill the Staff-Offices, without depriving the
Compys of their proper full proportion of Officers. The same reason which makes it proper to
have two Sergt Majors &c. in each Regt of Infantry, will also make it equally necessary to have
two Surgeons Mates.”).
131. To Washington from Duportail, supra note 126 (“So that after the Union every Officer
Should be without any Distinction an Artillery Officer and an Engineer.”).
132. To George Washington from Richard Platt, 21 September 1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-11837 (last modified Nov.
26, 2017) (file labeled “227342-body.txt”) (referring to “the undesireable office of Deputy
Quarter Master”).
133. To Washington from Duportail, supra note 126 (“[E]ach Company in time of
peace . . . [s]hall be composed of 3 Sergeants, 6 Corporals, 24 privates commanded by a first
Captn a Second Captn one first Lt and one Second Lieutenant. . . . I propose four Officers in
each Company . . . .”).
134. See, e.g., To George Washington from Charles, Marquis de La Rouërie Armand Tuffin,
28 September 1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents
/Washington/99-01-02-11866 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “227383-body.txt”).
135. To George Washington from Charles, Marquis de La Rouërie Armand Tuffin 30
ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/
September
1783,
FOUNDERS
Washington/99-01-02-11870 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “227394-body.txt”).
136. To Washington from Duportail, supra note 126; see also id. (“The Academy must be
commanded (under the Director General) by a field Officer . . . .”); id. (referring to “the
Director General” and then explaining that “[t]hrough him shall the Orders of Congress or of
the Board of War be transmitted to the Corps. Such an Office appears to me absolutely
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letter described officials on the “Executive Council to the Assembly of
Pennsylvania” as “executive officers.” 137 Writers used the term “office”
in reference to the position of Governor of the Province of Quebec, 138
the position of Treasurer, 139 and the position of President of the
Continental Congress. 140 Dr. Benjamin Franklin described himself as
having spent fifty years of his life “in public offices and Trusts,” 141 and
during his time serving as a diplomat overseas, John Adams described
himself as holding an “Office.” 142
necessary”). There also was a category of “Staff Officers,” From David Cobb to Timothy
Pickering, 17 September 1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE,https://founders.archives.gov/documents
/Washington/99-01-02-11825 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “227317-body.txt”),
and state “Militia officers” were discussed, From Alexander Hamilton to John Dickinson, [25–30
September 1783], FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton
/01-03-02-0288 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) [hereinafter From Hamilton to Dickinson] (file
labeled “227391-body.txt”).
137. From Hamilton to Dickinson, supra note 136. This letter also referred generally to
“officers” on a committee of the Continental Congress but did not provide any additional
information about the specific positions these “officers” held. See id.
138. See To James Madison from Edmund Pendleton, 29 September 1783, FOUNDERS
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-17-02-0339 (last modified
Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “227389-body.txt”) (“Sr. Guy Carltons Enquiry into the forgery
had probably a double view of screening the Offenders, & of exposing his predecessors
in Office . . . .”).
139. V. Jefferson’s Draft Resolution Authorizing Erection of Public Buildings for Use of
Congress, [1783?], FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/
01-06-02-0287-0006 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “227207-body.txt”) (“[T]he
Treasurer is hereby authorized and required to make on warrants from the Auditors according
to the established forms of his office.”).
140. To George Washington from Elias Boudinot, 17 September 1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-11822 (last modified Nov.
26, 2017) (file labeled “227314-body.txt”) (letter drafted by Elias Boudinot referring to his
“Office” during the time period that he served as president of the Continental Congress); see
also LIBR. OF CONGRESS, 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 377
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922), https://ia601405.us.archive.org/4/items/journalsofcontin24unit
/journalsofcontin24unit.pdf (reporting on June 2, 1783, that the “Seal of the United States of
America” had been affixed to Elias Boudinot, the President of the United States in Congress assembled).
141. To John Adams from Benjamin Franklin, 10 September 1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-15-02-0134 (last modified Nov. 26,
2017) (file labeled “227272-body.txt”).
142. From John Adams to Robert Morris, 14 September 1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-15-02-0141 (last modified Nov. 26,
2017) (file labeled “227302-body.txt”) (written when John Adams served as U.S. Minister to
the Netherlands). Writers also used the term “office” in contexts other than descriptions of
government or military positions. For example, the word “office” was used to describe the
relationship between nations. David Hartley to the American Peace Commissioners, 4 September
1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-15-02-0115
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These uses of the terms office(s) and officer(s) in the corpus files
from the 1780s provide some enlightening information about the
understanding of those terms during the time period leading up the
Constitution’s ratification. But they arguably do not provide nearly as
detailed an understanding of the broad range of the concept of officer
evident from Nathan Bailey’s eighteenth-century dictionary.
B. Dictionaries as a Corpus in Statutory Interpretation:
The Term Harbor
Examining a dictionary as a type of corpus also may provide
relevant information to a court engaged in statutory interpretation.
One of the advantages of searching throughout Bailey’s dictionary as
a corpus was that it enabled a manageable, but still somewhat
comprehensive, study of uses of the terms officer(s) and office(s).
Those terms appeared around 500 times in the dictionary 143—in
contrast to the more than 5,000 office(s) and officer(s) references in
the seven-year span of COFEA documents, which many scholars
might choose just to sample. 144
Sampling is an informative tactic. 145 But there is also a positive
breadth of information available from looking at every single use of a
term to define words throughout the entire range of the English
language as recorded in a dictionary. Such an examination of a recently
contested statutory term, “to harbor[],” gave insight relevant to the
issue before the federal circuit court hearing the case.
The question before Judge Posner and the Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Costello was whether a woman had “harbor[ed]” her
boyfriend by permitting him to live in her home after he entered the
country illegally and then committed a drug offense while living in

(last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “227220-body.txt”) (describing how a treaty would
lead to “the future Intercourse of all good offices between us”). And one sense of the term
“office” denoted a task or role. See, e.g., Abigail Adams to John Adams, 20 September 1783,
FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/04-05-02-0140 (last
modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “227331-body.txt”) (“No man was happier in the sons
his daughters had given him, two of whom attended him in his last moments, administering to
him, those kind offices, which his afflicted daughters could not perform.” (emphasis added)).
143. See Mascott, supra note 2, Section II.B.2.
144. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
145. See Strang, supra note 14, at 1206.
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her home. 146 In other words, was it harboring just to provide one’s
boyfriend with a “place to stay,” or does harboring require a more
intentional action like “providing . . . a known illegal alien a secure
haven, a refuge, a place to stay in which the authorities are unlikely to
be seeking him”? 147 Judge Posner relied in part on a Google search
suggesting that the term harboring co-occurs frequently with terms
that connote “deliberately safeguarding” someone from the
authorities. 148 He rejected the government’s alternative interpretation
that harboring includes any provision of a place to stay, which was
based in part on dictionary definitions indicating that to harbor
includes acts as minor as housing a person. 149
In a recent essay, Justice Lee and linguistics scholars praised Judge
Posner for moving in the right direction by expanding his interpretive
research beyond dictionary definitions. 150 They point out, however,
that Judge Posner’s search may have been somewhat arbitrary because
he did not explain how he chose which terms to pair with the present
participle harboring. 151 Also, Justice Lee and his co-authors pointed
out that Judge Posner omitted any research results on the frequency
of usage of the precise phrase that would have been of most relevance
to the statute—“harboring aliens.” 152
Both Judge Posner and the scholars are correct that the Google
corpus research in Costello provided helpful information beyond the
mere entry in a dictionary defining the word harbor. But expanding
dictionary use by examining it as a specialized corpus also could have
provided context and depth beyond the entry defining harbor itself.

146. See United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1041, 1049–50 (7th Cir. 2012)
(interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), which punishes “anyone who ‘knowing or in
reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States
in violation of law, conceals, harbors or shields from detection [or attempts to do any of these
things], such alien in any place, including any building or any means of transportation’” (quoting
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012) (alteration in original))).
147. See Costello, 666 F.3d at 1050.
148. See id. at 1044 (discussing the frequency of phrases such as “harboring fugitives,”
“harboring enemies,” and “harboring refugees”).
149. See id. at 1043.
150. Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 29.
151. See id. at 29, 29 n.36.
152. See id. at 28–29, 29 n.36 (describing how Judge Posner performed a Google search
for “harboring fugitives” and “harboring guests,” among other phrases—but not for “harboring
alien[s]”—the term referenced in the statute).
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One significant contribution of Judge Posner’s corpus work was
showing that the term harboring frequently arises in phrases that imply
intentional concealment such as “harboring fugitives” and “harboring
Jews.” 153 Examining one dictionary’s use of the term harbor in the
context of definitions for other terms similarly reveals this possible
connotation. But the dictionary’s contextual use of harbor actually
more frequently associates the term with the concepts of residence and
provision of a place to stay. 154
For instance, Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 155 uses
harbor in defining to cherish in part as “to entertain or harbor in the
mind deeply and resolutely.” 156 A connotation of concealment is
absent from this definition. Harbor also appeared in a definition for
carrier: “one that harbors and disseminates the causative agent of
disease infectious to its kind to which it is immune.” 157 The use of
harbor here also has more to do with residence than concealment,
similar to the other definitions for carrier like “a container for
carrying,” a “conveyer,” or a “bearer, messenger.” 158 Finally, harbor is
used in a way that does not connote concealment when Webster’s
defines “to hold” as to “harbor” or entertain a theory. 159
In contrast, perhaps sounding more like Judge Posner’s
conclusion that harboring necessarily involves “deliberate
safeguarding” from discovery, Webster’s defines the term haven both
as a (i) “harbor, port” and as (ii) “a place of safety: asylum.” 160 This
reference to harbor cuts both ways. On one hand, listing harbor as a
kind of synonym for haven along with the word port suggests the idea
of just a residence or a general safekeeping. On the other hand, the

153. See Costello, 666 F.3d at 1044.
154. Use of “Ctrl-F” identified more than seventy references to “harbor” and its variants
in the dictionary, but many of these uses occurred in back matter such as a pronunciation guide.
See WEBSTER’S, supra note 53. A spreadsheet detailing the references to “harbor” within the
dictionary definitions themselves is available at the Google drive referenced in supra note 53.
155. See WEBSTER’S, supra note 53.
156. Id. at 143. The dictionary defined the verb to harbor itself as “to give shelter or refuge
to”; “to keep possession of (an animal)”; “to be the home or habitat of: contain”; “to hold a
thought or feeling of”; “to take shelter in or as if in a harbor” as well as some other meanings
that it listed as relating only to animals. Id. at 379.
157. Id. at 128.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 396.
160. Id. at 381.
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association of harbor with terms like haven and asylum suggests the
more freighted concept of protection from harm or discovery.
Finally, some of the dictionary’s references to harbor were not
immediately determinative one way or the other. For example, the
noun form of the term is defined in part as “a place of security and
comfort: refuge.” 161 The term harbor’s association with “refuge”
perhaps implies protection from discovery; alternatively, the idea of
“security and comfort” is consistent with merely providing someone
a place to live. Similarly, the verb form of to harbor is defined both as
the more open-ended, “to be the home or habitat of: contain” as well
as the somewhat more freighted “to give shelter or refuge to.” 162 The
related noun “[h]arborage” is defined as “shelter” or “harbor.” 163
Judge Posner suggested the verb “‘[t]o shelter’ has an aura of
protectiveness.” 164 He thus concluded that the term harbor’s
association with the concept of shelter suggests that harboring involves
something more serious than housing one’s boyfriend. 165 A quick
check of just the first ten of 137 references to shelter in Webster’s
Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 166 echoes Judge Posner’s point but
also brings more depth to the analysis. Each of the first ten references
to shelter indeed associates the term with a sense of protection. For
example, an “accessory” is defined as “one who knowing that a crime
has been committed aids or shelters the offender with intent to defeat
justice.” 167 But sometimes the protection invoked by the word shelter
is just protection from outdoor elements like rain and sun—the type
of sheltering that occurs when one gives a friend a temporary place to
live. 168 This connotation of shelter arises in definitions for the term
airport (noting it usually “has facilities for the shelter, supply, and

161. Id. at 379.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1043 (7th Cir. 2012).
165. See id.
166. This is based just on the use of “Ctrl-F” to search the electronic file of the dictionary
for references to shelter A spreadsheet containing these first ten uses of shelter and its variants is
available on the Google drive cited in supra note 53.
167. WEBSTER’S, supra note 53, at 5 (emphasis added).
168. Cf. supra note 147 and accompanying text (identifying the legal question in Costello
as whether giving one’s boyfriend a place to stay amounts to “harbor[ing]”).
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repair of planes”) 169 as well as the term bivouac (“an encampment
under little or no shelter usu. for a short time”). 170
Here again, examining the dictionary as a corpus with numerous
contextual references to shelter illuminates a more comprehensive
range of the ordinary meanings associated with the term. The
interpreter then can return to the context of the relevant statutory
provision to determine whether the provision’s ban on harboring
more likely imports the synonym of shelter (i) in the freighted sense of
concealment, or (ii) the general sense of providing residence,
or (iii) both.
As scholars have noted, using corpora to identify all of the
permissible meanings of a term still leaves unaddressed how the
interpreter should select from those meanings to identify a term’s
“ordinary meaning.” 171 Should a term’s “ordinary meaning” be
measured by which meaning of the word most frequently arises in the
relevant corpora? 172 Or does the ordinary meaning of a statutory term
encompass all of the permissible meanings that fit within the relevant
statutory context?
Perhaps the proper question for the Seventh Circuit panel to have
addressed about the meaning of to harbor was not whether English
language speakers more frequently associate harboring with
concealment versus provision of a place to stay. Maybe instead the
court should have asked, what are all of the ordinary meanings of to
harbor that fit properly within the statutory context? Perhaps to harbor
encompasses both provision of a residence and deliberate
concealment—and both acts therefore are criminal under the statute.
Perhaps enterprise includes both organizations that have an “economic

169. WEBSTER’S, supra note 53, at 20 (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
171. See, e.g., Maggs, supra note 33, at 376 (noting there is still the question of selecting
between multiple dictionary definitions and recommending that interpreters “should consider
all of the possible meanings listed in a dictionary and state expressly the reasons that they are
choosing one meaning over others”).
172. Cf. Mouritsen, supra note 2, at 190, 201 (relying on the Oxford English Dictionary’s
“linguistic definition of ordinary” as language or usage “that [is] most commonly found or
attested” as guidance for basing his evaluation of the “ordinary meaning” of the term enterprise
on the context in which the word “is most frequently used”).
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motivation” and those that do not. 173 Perhaps the ordinary meaning
of the term to carry 174 includes both transporting a gun in a car and
the more common act of carrying a gun on one’s person. Perhaps the
statutory phrase “discharg[ing] [a] firearm” encompasses both a
single shot and multiple shots, 175 meaning the government could
charge someone who fires a burst of shots with just a single offense
rather than with multiple counts of discharging a weapon. In other
words, ordinary meaning might not mean picking the most common
use of a term but rather, identifying the full range of actions
encompassed by the permissible meanings of that term.
CONCLUSION
As linguists, legal scholars, and courts seek to perfect the most
appropriate way to incorporate corpus linguistics research techniques
into statutory and constitutional interpretation, 176 they should
consider using dictionary corpora as an interpretive starting point.
Legal interpreters certainly should not use dictionaries as their only
information source. But expanding the use of dictionaries to include
their examination as specialized mini corpora alleviates many of the
traditional concerns with reliance on dictionaries in constitutional and
statutory interpretation. Furthermore, examination of dictionaries as
corpora provides one manageable means to canvas language to
identify a wide range of permissible uses of a contested term. As
COFEA is developed, founding era dictionaries perhaps should be
included alongside the corpus’s natural language documents. And
before turning to a typical corpus linguistics database, interpreters
might better orient their empirical research by using a dictionary
corpus to identify the range of permissible language conventions.

173. See supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis of the RICO
statute included in Mouritsen, supra note 2).
174. See Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1916 (analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998), which analyzed the meaning of “carry” in
this context).
175. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Lee’s opinion in State v.
Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, 356 P.3d 1258 (2015), which utilized corpus linguistics analysis to
assess the ordinary meaning of “discharge”).
176. Cf. Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 30 (noting that scholars have not yet fully
“operationalized original public meaning” and, in particular, it is not yet explicitly clear whether
finding “original public meaning” is equivalent to “finding the most frequent usage between
competing senses of the word or phrase in question”).
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